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ABSTRACT 
 
Online forums have become a popular means of communication, embracing the concept of 
“customer co-creation” defined by service dominant logic. Many company sponsored online 
forums fail to grow, whereas others rapidly achieve a scale at which they become sustainable. 
There have been many narrative descriptions to propose reasons for success and many partial 
models based on network growth and random association. This paper makes a contribution to 
knowledge by proposing a model based on critical mass theories. This integrates a range of 
discipline bases and recognises the differential rates of contribution of contributors and the 
evaluations they make prior to contribution. Practical suggestions are made for how companies 
can use the principles of critical mass models to improve their “seeding” of new forums with a 
view to rapidly reaching a critical mass where a forum becomes sustainable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ommunication channels between companies and their customers have become transformed from 
predominantly bilateral to increasingly multi-lateral, in which technology allows customers to talk to 
their peers through various social network media. Online forums have emerged which can provide 
mutual support between customers, for example in resolving queries which might otherwise have been resolved 
bilaterally between a company and an individual customer. This “co-creation of value” (Vargo and Lusch, 2008a) 
presumes a willingness and ability of fellow consumers to sacrifice time and effort to produce benefits which may 
be appropriated by others, and not necessarily reciprocated (Wasco, Teigland and Faraj, 2009).  
 
Online forums play an increasingly important role in business and society (Füller et al., 2008; Dholakia et 
al., 2009; Demange, 2010). One challenge faced by an electronic forum is the availability of knowledge/ information 
(Harris and Rae, 2009; He , Qiao and Wei, 2009; Levy, 2009; Payne et al., 2009). Without continuing contributions, 
visitors would be less likely to visit a forum, and with fewer visitors, contributors of information may be less 
motivated to post comments, believing that their comments will not have significant impact if the audience is small. 
However, little research has been undertaken to understand at which level there are sufficient numbers of members 
producing knowledge which can further ensure others’ contribution.  And following from this, why do some forums 
survive into a sustainable state, while others fail to grow and eventually go into decline or disappear?  
This study seeks to make a contribution to knowledge by proposing a model of critical mass contribution to answer 
two main questions. 
 
1) Why do members voluntarily contribute knowledge to online forums? 
2) How can the structure of online networks be managed so that critical components (or “hubs” / “giant 
component”) can be present and further ensure sustainable contribution in Web-based networks?  
 
 
C 
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Against this background, this paper proposes an integrative model which is embedded in a theory of 
voluntary contribution and considers the dynamic structure of networks to fill the knowledge gaps identified above. 
The contributions of this study are therefore, to firstly investigate antecedents of voluntary mass contribution online, 
and secondly to provide a different method to understand the impact of the structure of networks on members’ 
contribution behaviours. This research reflects a pioneering stream of research in online network analysis which 
takes into account human factors as well as complex network structures. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: The literature review firstly discusses problem recognition and 
voluntary contribution behaviours in the context of online forums, and a critical mass contribution model is 
proposed. Following this are descriptions of network analysis highlighting the conditions for phase transition and 
identification of a giant component which can ensure the stable and continuous expansion of a complex network. 
Finally, theoretical and practical contributions are discussed.  
 
ONLINE FORUMS AS INFORMATION EXCHANGES 
 
Online forums are defined here as web-based newsgroups which allow people to post messages and 
comment on other messages. They generally involve some form of moderation and rules about who can post 
messages, initiate new « threads » and have access to all or parts of the forum. An online forum may be linked to a 
commercial organisation whose products are the focus of the forum, or it may be created by an individual or groups 
of individuals who share a common interest. Technically,  online forums sit between older format bulletin boards 
and more modern « groups » within social media platforms such as Facebook. The focus of this paper is the forum, 
but many of the principles discussed here could also apply to the older and newer technologies.  
 
Online forums can be conceptualised as network graphs consisting of nodes (human actors) and edges 
(social relationships), and imply structures marked by the emergence of hubs (giant component) (Dorogovtsev and 
Mendesy, 2002;Albert and Barabási, 2002; Newman,2003) which are influenced by mass voluntary collaborations 
(knowledge contributions) and interactions among members (message exchanges)(Wasco et al., 2009; Westland, 
2010).  
 
Two research streams have emerged to analyse online networks. A first stream has taken a physical 
sciences perspective to analyse the dynamic structure of networks and emphasizes the importance of degree 
distribution (the fraction of numbers of edges associated with a randomly selected member in a network) for 
subsequent growth of the network and its resilience to random attacks (Watts and Strogaze, 1998; Albert, Jeong and 
Barabási, 2000; Dorogovtsev, 2001; Newman, Strogatz and Watts, 2001).  A second stream has seen online 
networks as extensively created communities of individuals having a shared interest from very specialized niche 
interests, such as historic steam railways to much larger general interest communities, characterised by knowledge 
collaboration (O’Reilly, 2005; Wasco et al., 2009). In other words, the conditions for an online forum being 
successful rely on the extension of size as well as ongoing knowledge production.  
 
One interesting result generated from prior research leads to the phenomena of phase transition which can 
be understood as a tipping point at which the growth pattern of a network shows a discontinuity. In this respect, 
“giant components” or “hubs” play an important role in predicting phase transitions within networks . Giant 
components (or “hubs”) comprise individuals with a high number of connections within the network (Albert et al., 
2000; Dorogovtsev, 2001; Newman et al., 2001; Westland, 2010). In the theory of percolation as well as self-
organised criticality (Erdös and Rényi, 1960; Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld, 1987; Molloy and Reed, 1995; Callway, 
Newman and Strogats, 2000) the nature of phase transitions can facilitate a continuous and stable growth of the 
system, or self-sustainability in terms of the expansion of a network.   
  
Prior research has mainly focused on either understanding the function or dynamic characters of online 
networks, which explains conditions for the presence of a giant component, or the importance of knowledge 
exchanges among members in the extension of online forums. However, there are at least two gaps in previous 
research. Firstly, why do members contribute knowledge online and what motivates them to do so? Secondly, how 
does the structure of a network influence members’ contribution behaviours? Studies on the antecedents of voluntary 
mass contribution online are rare (Wasco et al., 2009) although their presence may provide intrinsic reasons for the 
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existence of online networks. Very few studies (Wasco et al., 2009; Centola, 2013) have proposed Critical Mass 
theory (Oliver and Marwell, 1988) to understand online voluntary contribution behaviours. However, Critical Mass 
theory by Oliver and Marwell (1988) only indicates that initial contribution behaviour can promote mass 
contribution, and it does not explain how the initial contribution is influenced by the structure of a network.  
 
Study of pilot results suggest that the logic of contribution behaviours initially presented by Oliver and 
Marwell (1988) is suitable for the analysis of online forums - members will contribute to a forum when their 
expected gain exceeds their sacrifice /cost. Secondly, the degree distribution - also known as the probability of a 
member with K connections -  follows the power law. In other words, the first condition for phase transition in 
online forums is satisfied. Thirdly, the “giant component” firstly presents itself when the mean numbers of the 
second neighbours exceed that of the first neighbours and is greater than 2. In other words, the second condition for 
phase transition is in agreement and the giant component is identified. Finally, according to complex network 
theories, contribution by a giant component which presents immediately after phase transition ensures continuous 
message exchanges in online networks.  
 
ONLINE INFORMATION AS “PUBLIC GOODS” 
 
Digital information can be considered to be a “public good‘‘. Four characteristics of public goods are 
nonrivalry of consumption, non-excludability, a decelerating production function and jointness of supply (Ostrom, 
2000; Wasco et al., 2009). In other words, public goods are outputs of collective contribution, and all individuals are 
able to access public goods regardless of their own contributions (Snidal, 1979). Furthermore, public goods such as 
public open spaces and public radio are not used up after consumption (Samuelson, 1954). The cost of joint 
production of public goods is lower than would be the case if the good was produced separately for each consumer 
(Buchanan, 1966). A classic example is public television broadcast, can be seen by all at home, satisfying the 
criteria for joint production of a public good (Wasko et al., 2009). Similarly, digital online forums provide collective 
intelligence through online publication of information, whose usage will neither exclude nor diminish the capability 
of access or usage by other users who follow. Once a message is published, the cost of jointly supplying it remains 
the same no matter how many members read the message (Wasco et al., 2009).  
 
The classic linear public good is illustrated through the utility function: U¡ = U¡[(E- X¡) +A* P (∑X¡)], 
where “E is an individual endowment of assets; X¡ is the amount of this endowment contributed to provide the good, 
A is the allocation formula, and P is the production function. A is specified as 1/N and 0<1/N<P<1, where N is the 
number of individuals (Ostrom, 2000, p.139)”. A specific characteristic of digital public goods is that they are 
indivisible, i.e. the information online remains the same however many times it has been read. Thus, the utility 
function of digital public goods is expressed as U¡ = U¡[(E- X¡) + P (∑X¡)], with  0<1/N<P<1, since there is no 
allocation problem any longer. 
 
One obvious problem associated with public goods is the social dilemma (Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom, 2010). 
According to Gintis (2007), the individual decision making model (named the rational actor model in economics) 
indicates that decisions are made to optimise a preference function subject to informational and material constraints. 
In other words, when every individual is rational and enjoys a public good for free, the public good will never be 
produced. Members of an online forum who benefit from this network but who wish to make little or no 
contribution, are called free riders.  
 
The above analysis suggests that overcoming the public goods / social dilemma problem requires collective 
actions that are specifically embedded in voluntary cooperation (Ostrom, 2000; Wasko et al., 2009). Explanations 
for why people contribute to online forums have been derived from economic, sociological and biological 
perspectives. One significant contribution derives from game theory, which has been refined with models of direct 
and indirect reciprocity to incorporate an individual’s expected return from their contribution (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Sugden, 1984; Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Groson, 2007; Imhof et al., 2007; Taylor & Nowak; 2007; Nowak et 
al., 2010). Theories of altruism have sought to explain why an individual takes care directly of others’ welfare at 
one’s own cost (Becker,1974; Frohlich, 1974), However, there are different underpinning assumptions for these 
theories. Altruism behaviours often present in homogenous populations, while reciprocity requires conditions of 
simultaneous contribution (Nowak et al., 2010). These theories have not taken sufficient account of the scale of 
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social networks relative to their heterogeneous population and subsequent activities in influencing contribution to a 
forum. It has been argued that critical mass theory (Oliver and Marwell, 1988) plays an important role in the 
development of online collective actions (Wasco et al., 2009) because it overcomes restraint assumptions associated 
with both theories of altruism as well as reciprocity.  
 
Critical mass theory (Oliver et al., 1985; Marwell et al., 1988; Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Prahl et al., 1991) 
incorporates theories of individuals’ rational choice into collective action (Centola, 2013) and argues that a group of 
initial contributors can pay the set-up cost and thereafter promote the mass contribution within a network. Online 
forums involve a minimum number of initial contributors. In the following sections, we will examine the concept of 
proportion of initial contributors in a large-scale social network embedded in the theory of critical mass. 
 
CRITICAL MASS 
 
Geng et al. (2004), describing e-communities as a type of online forum noted that they are made up of a 
dynamic-continuous inflow and outflow of members, who have imperfect information and memory. This aspect of 
dynamic e-communities calls for theories explaining how digital public goods could be contributed through the 
collective actions of a large, heterogeneous population. Furthermore, theories suitable for digital public goods deal 
with multiple processes rather than simultaneous contribution. That is, traditional theories of altruism and 
reciprocity alone are not able to explain mass collective actions in the emerging phenomena. Most recently, Wasko 
et al (2009) and Westland (2010) suggest that the theory of critical mass is relevant for understanding the digital 
public goods problem and free rider issue.  
 
Critical mass theory (Oliver et al., 1985) explains how a small number of selected individuals can have a 
powerful, positive impact on mass collective production. Similar to threshold models (Granovetter, 1978), it focuses 
on the number or proportion of self-interested contributors for whom net benefit exceeds net cost. This 
transformation is analysed through the contagion model in biology (Dodds & Watts, 2004), and self-organised 
criticality in Physics (Per Bak, Chao Tang and Kurt Wiesenfeld, 1987). In social life, one simple example is 
“fashion”, where several selected celebrities can evoke uniform massive behaviours.  
 
Critical mass theory is the most compelling argument of Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action (Oliver 
and Marwell, 2001). Olson (1965) points out that a rational individual will not behave cooperatively in order to 
achieve their common or general interest, without incentive or punishment mechanisms that reward co-operators or 
punish non-co-operators. Marwell and Oliver (1993) argue that initial contributors can create positive incentives for 
subsequent actors, which generates a widespread activity over the group to support the production of public goods. 
According to Marwell and Oliver (1993), there is a possible self-reinforcing system in collective actions and it is the 
initial contributors who pay the set-up cost and promote future contribution behaviours of subsequence actors.    
 
The original critical mass model developed by Marwell et al. (1988) can be employed to illustrate 
individuals’ decisions about contributing to public goods as follows: 
 
G= p(∑r)I – r, 
 
where G represents an individual’s net gain from contribution. It interprets the relationship between an 
individual and the group in general, thus, it omits the interactions between individuals but highlights the general 
exchange pattern; p(∑r) refers to the production function of the total contribution by all parties to public goods, 
which specifies the relationship between inputs of total resource contribution and outputs of levels of public goods. 
Furthermore, the production function in this model is a u-concave1 or accelerating function, which facilitates 
increasing marginal returns. In online discussion, for instance, one response to a seed message may tell 10% of the 
“truth”, the second one contributes to 20%, the third one goes to 50%, and the fourth perhaps up to 90%. In other 
words, an accelerating production function encourages individuals to make sequential contributions that are 
                                                
1 Contrast to u-concave or accelerating production function, u-convex or decelerating production function that traditionally studied in economical 
models fostered initial actions, which leads to strategic action and free-ride problem (Oliver and Marwell, 2001). For a given public good, the 
benefit to individual A exceeds largely A’s cost, thus it worth A to contribute this public good. Individual B knows A will whatever contribute, B 
could pay little or nothing but enjoy this public good in the future. 
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embedded in previous outputs, because additional contributions could accelerate achievement of certainty. However, 
the central challenge is to start collective actions because rational individuals will contribute in the late stage in 
order to enjoy higher payoffs; I is an individual’s interest level in the public good; And r means an individual’s 
contribution resource. That is, when p(∑r)>r/I, .i.e. the total payoff from all contributions to public goods exceeds 
the individual’s r/I ratio, an individual will make a positive contribution decision. In other words, the value of a 
given public good is subjected to available resources and the willingness to pay: the higher the interest level, the 
more possible that an individual contributes; the richer the resources available, the bigger the outputs. 
 
It can be concluded that there are two important assumptions in the critical mass model: the accelerating 
production function that highlights the feasibility problem2, and the group heterogeneity that allows either highly 
interested or resourceful individuals to pay the early start up cost of collective actions. The idea of critical mass is 
related to exactly these kinds of contributors. In this sense, the critical mass members attract numerous others to 
contribute sequentially. From this, we derive our first proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Critical mass is related to individual members’ motivation to voluntarily share knowledge online. 
 
The literature cited above indicates that the theory of critical mass contribution describes a phenomena of 
phase transition that can finally lead to stable and dynamic collective collaboration. However, the model proposed 
originally by Oliver and Marwell’s (1988) does not discuss how to identify the critical mass members  in groups. 
This could be one reason why theories of critical mass are often surrounded by disagreements. The following 
sections will discuss how the initial critical mass contributors are identified and embedded in network analysis.  
 
OVERVIEW OF ONLINE NETWORKS AND CRITICAL MASS MEMBERS 
 
Online social network is a topic in scale-free complex networks (Wang, Li and Chen, 2006; Wang and Dai, 
2009; Shi, 2011).  The concept of scale-free is developed by Barabási and Albert (1999) (“BA model”) from the 
random network theory (Erdös and Rényi, 1960) (“ER” model” and the Small World Network (Watts and Strogatz, 
1988) (“WS” model).  
 
In the random network theory (ER), a member chooses to randomly connect to another in a fixed N 
numbers of members in a community with a given probability p. As a result, the network contains on average 
p*N(N-1)/2 edges.  This is a typical binomial problem, members either connect or not to each other. That is, the 
probability which a member can have k connections Pk can be described as Pk = k
n−1( ) pk (1− p)n−1−k , the average 
connections is therefore K = p(N −1) . For a large N, the degree distribution follows the Poisson distribution: 
PK = e
−k k k / k! . In the qualitative interpretation, the Poisson form indicates the vast majority of members have 
roughly the same connections and a few members have connections which deviate significantly from the average.  
 
The main criticism of the random network theory approach is missing reference to preferential attachment 
(Watts and Strogatz, 1988; Chakrabarti and Faloutsos, 2006). In the real world, members typically choose to connect 
with members who are close to them rather than randomly. Stimulated by this observation, Watts and Strogatz 
(1988) suggest the Small World Model (WS), which starts with N nodes set in a circle and each is connected to its 
two neighbours by their sides. Thereafter, a probability p is given to members to form new edges or connections. 
The new edges are chosen equally at random. As a result, the degree distribution is similar to the bell curves of 
random networks with the peak at K  but with a shorter distance among members.   
 
Both the Erdös-Rényi and Watts-Strogatz models share an assumption that there are fixed N members who 
are either randomly connected or reconnected. However, as Barabasi and Albert (1999) point out, a real world 
network can enjoy a continuous increasing number of members throughout its lifetime. Combining the ER and WS 
model, they collect data from websites and found that the degree distribution obeys a power law. Different from the 
Poisson distribution, the Power law distribution indicates the absence of the mean connections (a peak in the bell 
                                                
2 Feasibity problem refers to finding an initial point which satisfys all constraints in an algorithm problem. In our case, it is associated with u-
concave production function. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2015 Volume 31, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 692 The Clute Institute 
curve) but the occurrence of hubs (infinitely close to the X axis). In other words, several hubs have the majority 
connections but the majority only have few or no connectivity with others in real networks such as social networks. 
According to Barabasi and Albert (1999), there is a continuous hierarchic variation but no typical scale connectivity 
between members, and this is a so called scale-free network.  
 
 
Source: Erdös P. Rényi A.(1960).  On the evolution of random graphs. Publ. Math. Inst. Hung. Acad. Sci., 5, 17-60.) 
Figure 1. An Illustration Of The Evolution Of Random Networks 
 
 
Source: Newman MEJ. (2003), The structure and function of complex networks, SIAM Review, 45, 167-256, 
Figure 2.  An Example Of The Bell Curve Of Random And Small World Networks 
 
Scale-free Networks 
 
The internet and increasing computing power facilitate data collection in large size networks. Recently, 
empirical research in complex networks such as Web hyperlinks, protein networks, wifi networks, actor cooperation 
networks etc suggests the power law tail charactering the degree distribution (Barabasi and Albert, 1999; 
Newman,2001; Dorogovtsev, 2002; He, Liu et Wang, 2009; Wang and Dai, 2009; Shi, 2011). In order to illustrate 
the evolution of scale-free networks, Barabasi and Albert (1999) address the BA model focusing on two generic 
attributes in many real world networks, exhibited through growth and preferential attachment. For example, the 
citations of an academic paper grow exponentially in time through new citation, and the new citation is more likely 
to depend on the cited times which may indicate the popularity of acceptance. These two properties demonstrate a 
good example of simplifying complex phenomena.  
 
The introduction to the logic of the BA model that has a power law degree distribution is as follows: 
 
Growth: starting with a small numberm0  of nodes, and a new node is introduced at every time step to m existed 
nodes, with m ≤m0 , in other words, this new node has m edges. 
 
Preferential Attachment: the probability ∏  that this new node will connect an existing nodei  depends on the 
degree ki of nodei  and k j  of existed node j , so that, =i∏
ki
k j
j
∑
 
P=0, ten isolated nodes P=1/N=0.1 P=15 /N=0.15 
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After t time, there are N=t+m0  nodes and E =mo( mo−1) / 2+mt edges, and the simulation by Barabasi and 
Albert (1999) indicates that a network evolves into the state where few highly connected hubs can dominate the 
network’s connectivity.  In other words, the network is more resilient to random attacks than particular attacks on 
hubs. A mathematical relationship is introduced to describe the degree distribution in scale-free networks: 
P(k) ∼ k −γ where P(k) stands for the degree distribution of the probability of nodes connecting to k others 
members, and ϒ  is the degree exponent which is equals to 3.  
 
The interesting result emerging from this simulation is that the exponent is independent from m which is 
the only parameter in the model (Barabasi and Albert,1999). In other words, the growth of networks is mostly 
influenced by the hubs which dictate the connectivity of the network.  
 
(a) Degree distribution for model A for m0 = m =1 (circles), m0 = m = 3 (squares), m0 = m = 5 (diamonds), and m0 = m = 7 
(triangles). The size of the network is N = 800, 000. Inset: time evolution for the degree of two vertices added to the system at t1  
= 7 and t1  = 97. Here m0  = m =3. The dashed line follows ki( t )=mln( m0 + t −1) . (b) The degree distribution for model B for N 
= 10,000 and t = N(circles), t = 5N (squares), and t = 40N (diamonds). Insert: time dependence of the degree of two vertices. The 
system size is N = 10, 000. After Barabasi, Albert and Jeong (1999).  
Figure 3. 
 
Dynamic Processing In Scale-Free Networks  - Highest Degree 
 
As discussed above, hubs reflect the connectivity that a real network allows. A network is vulnerable by 
deletion of its highest-degree members and their associated edges but resilient to random attacks (Albert et al., 1998; 
Broder et al., Jeong et al.; Newman, 2003). In other words, if there is one path linking one member to the critical 
components, then one member can communicate with an extensive fraction of the entire network. If the path is 
deleted or the associated critical component is removed, one member can only communicate with a few others at 
most (Newman, 2003).  
 
Empirical studies (Dorogovtsev and Samukhin, 2001; Moreira et al., 2002) on the highest or maximum 
degree  in scale-free networks suggest that , if pk ∼ k
−a  , then kmax ∼ n
1/(a−1) . For instance, a central vertex in a scale-
free network of 1,000 vertices with the exponent a = 3 can have 10 maximum connections, and 1,000 maximum 
connections with the exponent a = 2.  In other words, the number of edges has a negative relationship with the 
control parameter a. According to Albert et al. (2000), there is a critical value for a=2 at which the critical 
component occurs, and below which the networks can be completely connected.  Albert et al. (2000) further found 
that a  between 2-3 is in agreement with real Internet based networks such as online forums.  
 
Furthermore, if the parameter a is known, noting for example a=3, while the size of networks increases 
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from 1,000 to 10,000 members, the maximum connections increase from 10 to 100.  The maximum degree is 
therefore positively associated with the size of networks. However, as a network is evolving with time and new 
nodes are continuously joining into the networks, the size can tend towards infinity, which makes it difficult to 
compute the maximum degree.   In most cases, one can work with the average of maximum degree (Albert et al. 
2000). Mo riʹ′ (2005) later proposed an alternative method which indicates that Kmax ∼ t
1/2u .Where u is a set of 
absolutely continuous variables, following a normal distribution. This result is generated from the condition when 
every new member is attributed with only one edge.    Zhou, Ye and Yan (2010) further propose the experimental 
formula for computing the average of maximum degrees in infinitive BA networks: E km(t)!" #$ ≈ (20.11m+329.8)t
1/2
, 
where  m represents the number of edges uniformly associated to a new member (1≤m<3), t is number of periods of 
evolution.  When m=3, lnu = ln t−1/2km(t)"# $%∼ N (0.4884,0.0745
2) .  
 
 However, it is not difficult to compute the highest degree in real world scale free networks which always 
have a finite size. Nevertheless, there may be more than one member with maximum connections, and those 
members have been referred to as a giant component or hubs. The important position of the giant component in 
networks will be further discussed in the following sections.  
 
Self-Organised Criticality 
 
The discovery of scale-free networks where degree distributions obey the power law form has evoked great 
interest in network research. In fact, the emergence of complex network theory is a topic about the complex system 
which has been studied in diverse fields from biology, physics to economy (Wang et al. ;2006). To date, there is no 
widely accepted definition of a complex system. However, the shared concept in this field leads to the theory of self-
organised criticality (SOC)( P. Bak, C. Tang & K. Wisenfeld, 1987) which explains how the non-linear interactions 
among mass nodes and in particular in hubs can bring a phase transfer even under conditions of non central control,  
asymmetric  information and local movement. This is often employed to explain the disappearance of the dinosaur, 
avalanches, earthquakes and bull or bear stock markets (Wang & Dai, 2009).    
 
Self-organised criticality is considered as a ‘must’ connection to scale-free networks which is further 
supported by the observation of the power law tails (He et al., 2009).  The Sandal model by Bak et al. (1987) is the 
classical example to illustrate the concept of SOC. Consider a desk where a number of grains is introduced 
randomly. Thereafter a new grain is added and the height of sandal increases by repeating this step. As the pile 
grows, its slope becomes steeper until additional grain triggers a local avalanche. After a while, the pile reaches a 
critical height  Hi,  newly joined grain leads to a large avalanche and the pile spreads aside. A critical point occurs 
where a single movement such as falling of a new grain at a tipping point can evoke the change of the whole system. 
This is self-organised in that there is no invisible hand or external factors which are manipulating this phase transfer, 
because this pattern occurs spontaneously.  
 
Results of extensive simulations on the sandal model (Albert and Barabasi, 2000) indicate that the 
distribution of the size of the avalanche follows the power law form and is described as ： N (s) = s−t , where N(s) 
stands for the size of collapse event , t is the exponent parameter. The negative of t indicates that the size of collapse 
decreases when the size of sandal S increases.   
 
For both scale-free as well as self-organised criticality theory, the critical or giant component is widely 
recognized as the key factor of interest. In the theory of scale-free network, giant component or hubs are vertexes 
which own the majority connections, and this aspect is crucial against random attack to the network. That is, if hubs 
are not attacked, the network remains largely undamaged. In the theory of self-organised criticality, the critical 
component predicts the phase transaction. The idea is that local disturbances in time and space are accumulated 
exponentially, which allows the occurrence of the giant component at the critical point over which the avalanche is 
generated.  
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“Giant Component”  
 
The motivation behind self-organised criticality theory is that it can show phase transitions on scale free 
networks.  In fact, there are extensive studies about phase transitions on random networks embedded in the bond 
percolation theory (Erdös and Rényi, 1960; Burton and Keane, 1989; Molly and Reed, 1995).  
 
Previous numerical analytical results (Albert and Barabasi, 2000) derived from percolation process 3in 
random networks with Poisson degree distribution indicates that the condition for the emergence of the critical 
component is: pc=
1
z −1
, where pc is the critical point when the giant component is emerging; z(=3) is the maximum 
acquaintance of the origin site;  z-1 means that at least one of z-1 edges connects the origin node to others. Similar to 
the theory of self-organised criticality which describes the phase transition happening almost immediately after the 
occurrence of the critical components, linkage possibility p ≥ pc  assures that network growth is continuous or self-
sustainable since the giant component appears and they own infinitive outgoing edges.  
 
Results from studies on Power law degree distribution networks show a qualitatively similar phase 
transition behaviour to that of Poisson random graph (Albert et al., 2000; Newman et al., 2000; Broder et al., 2001). 
For instance, the configuration model (Newman et al., 2001; Newman, 2003) is a general approach to random 
graphs with power law degree distribution. According to this model, there is a set of n value of degree sequence
k1,k2 ,,,,,kn{ } . If one chose randomly an edge (node which is reachable at one side belongs to G0 (x) ), one can 
always find a vertex plus some other cluster of vertices at the other end of this edge (noted asG1(x) ). Nodes are 
thereafter classified into two groups and the two proceed in generating functions of the degree distributions: 
G0 (x) = P(k)x
k
k=0
∞
∑ , G1(x) =
kP(k)xk−1
k
∑
kP(k)
k
∑
=
1
k
#G0 (x) , where k is the average number of the first neighbours of a node or the 
mean degree in the network !G0 (1) . kP(k) tells that a randomly chosen edge associated to a node with k degree is 
proportional to the degree of that node. xk means there are k ways to reach a node with degree k.  Given an example 
by Newman et al., (2001), there are 1000 members in a finite network, and each of them has acquaintances range 
from zero to five, 86,150,363,238,109,54{ } , therefore, G0 (x) = 86+150x +363x
2 + 238x3 +109x4 +54x5
1000
 ; 
k = kpk
k
∑ = 0+1* 1501000 + 2*
363
1000
+3* 238
1000
+ 4* 109
1000
+5* 54
1000
= 2.296 ≈ 2 ; 
 
Following the outside edges of the first neighbours, there are next-nearest neighbours and this process is 
repeated until the end of those edges. To distinguish from the first selected edge, Newman (2003) introduces the 
concept of excess degree to depict those leaving edges.  
 
With distribution probability, the generating function for the average cluster size of first and the second 
neighbours can be defined because the degree distribution probability of one vertex is the fraction of the total 
number of degrees: s =1+
!G0 (1)
!G1(1)
=1+
z1
2
z1 − z2
, where !G0 (1) = k  = z1 , and z2 = k
2 − k = "G0 (1) "G1(1) , the average 
number of second neighbours. It shows that the condition for phase transitions in scale-free networks can be written 
as: k(k − 2)P(k)
k∑ = 0  or 
k 2
k
= 2 , and k 2 = k 2
k∑ P(k) = k
2
+ k . In other words, the giant component presents when 
the average number of the second neighbours exceeds the average number of the first neighbours (Dorogovtsev and 
Mendes, 2001). This result is interesting because it suggests that the Scale Free networks with exponent parameter a 
                                                
3 Results are generated from percolation process on a Cayley tree with coordination number z=3, and average degree approaches to 2. A Cayley 
tree holds a property in common with radaom graph (Albert and Barabasi, Statistical mechanics of complex networks, 2002). 
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between 2 and 3 always percolates, indicating that critical component always exists in networks, if the average 
degree of networks is superior to 2  (Cohen, Erez, ben-Avraham and Havlin, 2000; Albert et al., 2000; Newman, 
2001). After the phase transition, the size of giant component is continuously growing, and near the critical point of 
transitions, the average size of the giant component is computable.  
 
PROPOSED MODEL OF CRITICAL MASS CONTRIBUTION 
 
As discussed previously, the original critical mass theory (Marwell and Oliver, 1988) can be applied to 
understand members’ voluntary contribution behaviour on online forums. In order to identify critical mass members 
in online forums, network structural analysis should be incorporated. There exists a critical probability cp at which 
a phase transition occurs and a “giant” component with computable size firstly appears. With this condition, online 
forums could enjoy continuous growth in terms of size and message exchanges. In other words, the knowledge 
sharing within networks is dependent on giant component comprised of “critical mass members”. This is in 
agreement with the critical mass theory (Marwell and Oliver, 1988) which highlights the importance of minimum 
initial contributors in evoking mass collective actions. Similar to the work of Westland (2010), we understand that 
‘giant’ component and critical mass member have equivalent meaning regarding their importance in phase 
transition.   
 
It has been widely accepted that members who participate in online knowledge sharing such as initially 
proposing a message and joining others’ discussions will benefit from publicly available information support 
(Preece, 2002; Ridings and Gefen, 2004b; Wasko et al., 2009). A seed message is considered potentially useful 
information when it is discussed among members. The discussed message is often value-added knowledge since 
discussers could contribute their further understandings to the seed message. Therefore, the total number of 
discussed seed messages which are accessible to each member represent their benefits. This is consistent with the 
view of the characteristics of online knowledge as digital public goods (Wasko et al., 2009). Therefore: 
 
Proposition 2: The benefit for critical mass members can be represented through the total number of discussed 
messages, which are accessible to every member.  
 
According to Critical mass theory (Marwell and Oliver, 1988), contribution behaviours are in proportion to 
members’ potential benefit from the public goods. Similarly, the more attractive that a particular topic appears to 
members of an online forum, the more possible that members would participate online discussions around that topic. 
Researchers such as Odlyzko and Tilly (2005) and Westland (2010) have argued that the size of a group could be a 
measure of the interest level of such group. We propose therefore that the size of audience of messages created by 
critical mass members is a good indicator of the interest level of these messages. In addition, we argue that the 
interest level of a message can reflect the interest level of the poster since a member publishes a message and seeks 
further discussions through a lengthy “thread”, although it is necessary to note that members who are interested in a 
particular topic may not participate in discussions around that topic (Wasko et al., 2009). That is, the size of 
audience includes members who answer messages and those who are merely watching.  
 
Westland (2010) introduces the logarithmical concept, Log(ňs (p)) representing the logarithm of average 
number of each member’s special interest clusters containing s members, as the indicator of the level of interest of 
the online community. In our study, we further define the size of cluster S as satisfying the condition where the 
group of critical mass members firstly appears, s =1+
!G0 (1)
!G1(1)
=1+
z1
2
z1 − z2
 (Newman, 2003).   The use of logarithmical 
measurement on humans’ perception is common in biological and physical studies (He, Liu and Wang, 2009). 
Logarithmical measure is more robust than simple summarization of numbers of interested individuals. It is 
presumed that human perception logarithmically transforms intensities for obtaining a wider perceptive range that 
crosses multiple orders of magnitude. This idea is mostly reflected through examples such as human perception of 
light, sound and other sensory information (Westland, 2010).  
 
Proposition 3: The level of critical mass members’ interests in supplying knowledge online can be represented 
through the logarithm of the total number of replied and viewed messages created by critical mass members. 
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According to Oliver and Marwell (1988), the cost of contribution is the resource used up by the contributor. 
de Valck et al. (2009) argues that in the context of an online community, members who participate in online 
discussions may encounter risks which are associated with members’ private resources, such as time, psychology 
and social risks. For example, a devoted member contributes a lot of time participating in online discussions, which 
leads to less time for enjoying something else. Furthermore, members may process their private information through 
Internet channels, where anxieties could occur if the capacities of online communities to treat such information are 
questioned. Again, members may judge others’ options, and their judgment may be influenced by others both 
positively as well as negatively. An individual who belongs to a social group is unwilling to be excluded and/or to 
take related social risks. However, the above mentioned resources for contribution can be represented through 
published messages. For instance, time cost is proportionally related with posting messages. Psychological barriers 
such as anxieties can be demonstrated through either continuing to debate with others or giving up discussions. 
Again, members may be either encouraged or discouraged to post messages according to the popularity of messages 
posted by them. Riding and Wasco (2010) summarize that message volume can represent contribution resources. It 
is therefore suggested that published messages are knowledge which reflect intellectual resources owned by message 
publishers. 
 
Proposition 4: The cost of contributions by critical mass members can be represented by the total number of 
messages posted by them. 
 
Finally, the production function in the critical mass model (Marwell, Olivier and Prahi, 1988) describes the 
relationships between input recourse of all contributors and outcomes of public goods. It is an accelerating function 
because successive contributions generate larger payoffs (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira, 1985). It is true in online 
forums, where value-added messages not only benefit for members but also for visitors.   
 
Proposition 5: The production function of online forums can be represented through the total number of posts by 
reply and by view. 
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Online forums play an increasingly important role in business strategy, as communication channels 
between companies and their customers have been transformed from predominantly bilateral to increasingly multi-
lateral. They allow  customers to become “co-creators” of value and provide a practical application of this aspect of 
service dominant logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2008a). This “co-creation of value”) presumes a willingness and ability of 
fellow consumers to sacrifice time and effort to produce benefits which may be appropriated by others, and not 
necessarily reciprocated (Wasco, Teigland and  Faraj, 2009).  
 
The literature cited above indicates that critical mass contribution models describe a transition model that 
leads to stable and dynamic collective collaboration. However, Oliver and Marwell’s (1988) model does not analyse 
the ratio of initial contributors and their identification in groups. This could be one reason why theories of critical 
mass are often surrounded by disagreements.  
 
Companies providing online forums should address the phenomena of phase transition which can be 
understood as a tipping point at which the growth pattern of a network shows a discontinuity. “Giant components” 
or “hubs” play an important role in predicting this phase transitions within networks . Hosts of online forums should 
pay strong attention to these giant components or hubs, which comprise individuals with a high number of 
connections within the network 
 
Within any model, an online forum must understand the logic of contribution behaviours. Essentially, 
members will contribute to a forum when their expected gain exceeds their sacrifice /cost ad explanations for such 
contributions have been derived from economic, sociological and biological perspectives.  
 
Forum hosts should not rely on altruism alone to encourage contributions.. Altruism behaviours often 
present in homogenous populations, whereas reciprocity requires conditions of simultaneous contribution among 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2015 Volume 31, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 698 The Clute Institute 
often heterogeneous groups . Theories of altruism have not taken sufficient account of the scale of social networks 
relative to their heterogeneous population and subsequent activities in influencing contribution to a forum. In this 
respect, critical mass theory provides firms with a useful framework for understanding the development of online 
collective actions, by incorporating theories of individuals’ rational choice into collective action. It is based on the 
principal that a group of initial contributors can pay the set-up cost and thereafter promote the mass contribution 
within a network. Critical mass theory explains how a small number of selected individuals can have a powerful, 
positive impact on mass collective production, by focusing on the number or proportion of self-interested 
contributors for whom net benefit exceeds their net cost. 
 
Companies have traditionally sought to recruit opinion leaders to be initial adopters of new products, in the 
expectation that hey will pass on word of mouth recommendation to others. Recruitment to online forums can 
usefully adopt similar principles and a critical mass model can help to identify and quantify the number of such 
“seedcorn” members who are needed in order to pass a tipping point at which the forum becomes sustainable. The 
model offers a big advantage over random network models, because in the real world, members typically choose to 
connect with members who are close to them rather than randomly with others.  
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